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 T R U T H  
 I
n his final works, Foucault explains his overall project as a “history of truth” 
centered on the relations between subjectivity and truth. Whereas the early archae-
ology focuses primarily on the formation of new objects and discourses of knowl-
edge, and later, genealogy focuses on techniques of power and self-formation, the 
problematic of truth is the overriding framework through which Foucault develops 
these analyses. Throughout all of his work, in fact, Foucault’s question is how dis-
course, institutions, politics, and subjects are established within regimes of truth. 
 To emerge as a knowable object in reality is also always to enter into a regime 
of truth, according to Foucault. A regime (or game) should be understood as a set 
of rules and constraints divided between true and false discourses and practices 
(EEW1, 297). With this notion, Foucault displaces the traditional correspondence 
theory of truth, which holds that our knowledge must correspond with or rel ect 
pregiven objects in reality. In order to correspond with these objects, a certain form 
of subjectivity is required that would be able to access the truth of these objects and 
hold onto this truth over time. In the history of philosophy, this subject usually takes 
on a set of universal and ahistorical characteristics that are necessary to have access 
to such knowledge. When the subject possesses these characteristics naturally and 
without any necessary history or practice, Foucault calls this kind of subject one that 
possesses truth through  self-evidence . 
 Foucault’s philosophy of truth resists the notion that there is either an a priori 
constituted subject or a pregiven object and instead examines the historical constitu-
tion of the subject , the object, and their interrelation. If truth, in Foucault’s thought, 
is involved with correspondence, it can only be one that is historically produced 
(Gros  2004 , 11–12). His entire philosophical career involves a critique of the notion 
of  self-evidence and the subject and object that would naturally correspond in such 
a relation. In his philosophy of truth, it can be seen that each period of his thought 
involves a critique of self-evidence from a different vantage point, whether it be the 
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history of scientii c discourse, the immanence of power and knowledge, or the sub-
ject’s relation to itself. 
 Through the critique of self-evidence, Foucault situates the problem of truth 
at the historical level, excavating the historical conditions of possibility of a given 
regime of truth. This is the aim in combining key insights of the Kantian analytic 
with history, in what Foucault calls the  historical a priori . Instead of asking what it is 
that makes possible a universal subject capable of knowledge in general, it asks what 
embeds a subject within a particular regime of truth, what practices are required, 
what discourses are accepted, and what cost is paid for the subject to enter into that 
reality. At the same time, the question is one of the conditions behind an object 
becoming a positive i gure of knowledge . What procedures, what order of space , vis-
ibility, and time, what institutions, and what relations of power were required for an 
object such as madness, perversion, delinquency, or the anthropological ideas of the 
human being to emerge as knowable objects? For Foucault, a regime of truth is the 
nexus between the historical conditions of possibility of the subject and the historical 
conditions of possibility of the object. It is the site where truth names the constraints 
and modalities required of both subject and object to enter the positivity of reality 
and engage in a set of possible relations (EEW2, 459–460; EEW3, 242–254). 
 Rel ections on truth at the level of history generally tend toward the view that 
truth is without history entirely, or that its history can only be one of progressive 
unfolding and clarii cation. The latter, teleological view claims that through time we 
are i nally able to grasp the great truths of labor, life, language, psychology, sexuality, 
human rights, liberal government, and so on. These were truths that always existed 
outside of history, but to discover them it required the test of time and the trial and 
error of i nite human practice: slowly through history, the ini nite unshakeable truth 
reveals itself in the i nite . 
 Instead of a universal theory of truth modii ed by the modalities of teleological, 
revealing, or obscuring history, Foucault thinks of a topology of truth in its history 
and geography. Truth is linked to history in the modality of the event, which requires 
an examination of its conditions of emergence and its geography of instantiation. 
Truth is produced within a certain set of circumstances and produces a certain set 
of behaviors and constraints. The truth-event opposes the notion of self-evident 
demonstrative truth that can be found in any place or any time regardless of the cir-
cumstances. In short, Foucault would like to study a “truth which does not belong to 
the order of what is, but to the order of what happens, a truth, therefore, which is not 
given in the form of discovery, but in the form of the event, a truth which is not found 
but aroused and hunted down: production rather than apophantic” (ECF-PP, 237). 
 In his archaeological texts from  History of Madness through  The Archaeology of 
Knowledge , Foucault develops a methodological principle: the rejection of the uni-
versal from the start in order to examine the  event of knowledge and its rules of 
construction. Traditionally, the history of science has taken the “universality” of a 
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scientii c discovery and used it as a i lter to examine the history of errors and mis-
takes leading up to this truth. The truth then allows us to separate it from all of the 
errors and ideologies that led up to its discovery (Gros  2004 , 13). In short, the purity 
of the scientii c lineage leading up to this truth is extracted from its accidental and 
erroneous history. 
 Foucault’s archaeological method is the inverse of this. Instead of starting with 
the universal, he starts with a particular discourse and excavates the archaeological 
conditions that made such a discourse possible. As he would later explain in a lecture 
at the Collège de France:
 [I]nstead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting 
with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, 
I would like to start with these concrete practice s and, as it were, pass these uni-
versals through the grid of these practices. . . . It was the same question in the case 
of madness. . . . If we suppose that it does not exist, then what can history make of 
these different events and practices which are apparently organized around some-
thing that is supposed to be madness? (ECF-BIO, 3; see also EAK, 207) 
 Madness should be supposed not to exist, in the sense that it does not have any ahis-
torical or universal reality that we can use to interpret its particular historical varia-
tions. Instead, the key to understanding the truth regime of madness is found in the 
rules and practices by which madness was produced as an object to be known and 
controlled, along with the forms of subjectivity that it produced and constrained. 
So, the truth of madness is not to be discovered internal to some true or false def-
inition of “madness in itself” but is instead the very reality produced by a game of 
truth. Truth does not correspond to some pregiven object, as in the classical corre-
spondence theory of truth, but instead truth is itself productive of and produced by 
reality. 
 It should be noted here that Foucault is not interested in any and all games 
of truth or a critique of science as such. His interest, instead, is in those discourse s 
and games that involve the truth of the human subject, or how “the subject him-
self becomes an object of possible knowledge ” (EEW2, 460). Namely, the task is 
to see how a possible “science of the human” developed and how a truth game was 
crystallized around the human. As Frédéric Gros writes, “man is fundamentally 
thought in [Foucault’s] work as  an animal of truth ” (Gros  2004 , 11, Gros’s italics). All 
of Foucault’s analyses aim to excavate the processes through which man has become 
both an object and a subject of truth: from the human sciences to the incitement of 
discourse where the subject seeks to constantly produce and discover an inner truth 
through confession and self-examination (see EHS1). 
 The analysis of madness can then be situated as the initiation of Foucault’s stud-
ies of man ’s enmeshment within a game of truth.  History of Madness examines how 
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the Renaissance understanding of madness as a force inhabiting the entire cosmos 
was transformed into a psychological truth of the human being. How was the seat of 
the truth of madness shifted from the fabric of the cosmos to an exclusive location 
within the human being? Furthermore, how did the truth of madness as the irratio-
nal exterior to human reason serve to found the truth interior to modern reason? 
 Foucault shows that the division between madness and reason is not established 
on some pure rational decision. It is not a positivistic universal that can retrospec-
tively be separated from its accidental history. Instead, the modern truth regime of 
madness is rooted in a political and economic history of division: the great coni ne-
ment of the mad and the poor across Europe in the seventeenth century. This posi-
tion of exclusion was a fundamental condition of possibility for the division between 
madness and reason and for the emergence of mental illness as a scientii c discourse 
and object of study. In the great coni nement, the mad had not been separated from 
indolence and other forms of social deviance. Yet, it was in this space of coni nement 
where the i rst doctors of mental illness began to articulate a scientii c discourse 
based on the emergent order of visibility and sayability. However, even the scientii c 
basis on which these doctors could make their statements about mental illness was 
lacking. This construction was instead based on a complicated subjection of the mad 
through new structures of recognition and rel exivity. The famous liberation of the 
mad from their chains in France was coupled with the development of a whole new 
structure of subjection whereby the mad were led to recognize and internalize their 
own illness: physical chains substituted for psychical ones. Further, this was a dis-
course rooted in a i gure of authority, the medical person, which did not yet have a 
scientii c basis for understanding madness. 
 In this sense, the scientii c status of the truth of madness as mental illness is 
shown to have its archaeological roots in a game of division and exclusion that is not 
evidenced on the surface of its discourse. The  self-evidence of the mad subject as a 
natural scientii c object to be studied is thrown into question, and the event of mad-
ness in its formation of rules and divisions is shown to be the proper site of inves-
tigation of its truth regime. The self-evidence of knowledge would set up a direct 
correspondence wherein the subject is not transformed or constrained in order to 
come into relation with the truth. Instead Foucault studies the processes through 
which this relation between subject and object is made possible: at what price and 
with what history does an object emerge as something that can be known? What 
effects of constraint, obedience, and subjection must subjects pass through in order 
to be knowable as objects of truth? 
 Foucault’s aim is not, however, to claim that the scientii c discourse of men-
tal illness is in itself  true or  false or even ideological. Mental illness possesses its 
own truth regime and a reality that is not at all illusory. The task is not to propose 
its falsii cation by referencing some greater truth but instead to expose its condi-
tions of construction, thus demonstrating that truth never rests purely on its own 
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foundations but is always bound to a relation of otherness in its ties to a long institu-
tional and political history. As Foucault claims in his i nal unpronounced notes to his 
i nal lecture at the Collège de France, “truth is never the same” (ECF-COT, 340). 
 Foucault’s archaeological examination of scientii c discourse initiated a number 
of critiques against the Marxist theory of truth, critiques that were further devel-
oped in his genealogy of power. In fact, Foucault claims that the prominent power-
 knowledge dyad of this period was intended as a displacement of Marxist ideology 
theory (FCF-GDV, 74–78). Generally speaking, ideology theory supposes that a cri-
tique of a given discourse as false or ideological will allow one to attain a deeper 
underlying truth: smashing the veneer of ideology opens up the path of the real and 
the true. For Foucault, there is no deeper layer of reality that can be found under-
neath the surface and there is no deeper truth that he claims to reveal underneath 
the divisions and constraints of a truth regime. 
 Ideology theory claims, furthermore, that false appearances are due strictly 
to the machinations of power and that the brilliance of truth could tear down this 
facade. This schema is evidenced in the great battling cry of political analysis and 
activism: “We must speak truth to power.” This cry is quite familiar to the history 
of the West, such that Foucault situates its emergence with the Greeks, all the way 
back to Sophocles’  Oedipus Rex and Plato ’s political philosophy (EEW3, 30–32). 
This cry supposes that if we were able to penetrate the iron gates of power with 
all of the brilliant and incriminating truths it has been hiding, then power would 
simply collapse and lose the legitimate grounds for its justii cation. In short, it is 
supposed that truth and power are external to one another and that power can only 
legitimate itself through an illusory or deceptive relation to the truth. Foucault’s 
intervention into political analysis is to show that we should no longer consider 
truth and power in relations of externality but instead consider them in a i eld of 
immanence. Every form of power is supported by a network of truth relations, and 
every regime of truth carries with it effects of power (EEW3, 132–133). Just as he 
refused it in the study of madness, Foucault will refuse the claim that a truth regime 
is false or ideological because it is produced by and produces relations of power. 
Instead, he will aim to show that truth is itself immanent to power and produces 
power relations. 
 Truth, then, is not a strictly epistemological problem where the purity of knowl-
edge is opposed to the effects of coercion produced on the subject through power. 
Instead, truth involves relations of force that compel certain conducts and produce 
forms of subjectivity. As Foucault explained in an interview, “My problem is to see 
how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth (. . . not the pro-
duction of true utterances but the establishment of domains in which the practice 
of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent)” (EEW3, 230). This 
dei nition of his problem, which could apply to his entire corpus, points to the way in 
which the direction of human conduct is always compelled by a discourse or ordering 
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of the true and the false. Political power is unintelligible without the deployment of 
truth as a matrix through which subjects govern themselves and others. 
 In moving away from epistemological models to a study of political regimes 
of truth, Foucault will study the role of truth in relation to the history of juridical 
forms. The relationship between what he will call veridiction (the establishment of 
veridical domains or truth regimes) and juridical forms or jurisdiction is present in 
most of his studies during the 1970s. These analyses show the points at which polit-
ical technologies move between a foundation and legitimation rooted primarily in 
juridical forms to one rooted primarily in a regime of truth. Generally speaking, 
this is the framework of analysis for  Discipline and Punish . In this work, Foucault 
provides a genealogy of the process through which the juridical question of “what 
did you do?” is displaced by a question of truth about the subject: “who are you?” 
(EDP, 17–19). The whole apparatus of disciplinary power is predicated on this new 
technology of truth that seeks to i nd the truth of the individual, rather than one that 
seeks to establish whether a certain infraction was broken, requiring a codii ed pun-
ishment. Modern governmental power is thus primarily supported by veridiction, 
the division between the true and the false, and only secondarily tied to jurisdiction, 
the division between the permissible and the nonpermissible. 
 In a series of lectures from 1973 in Rio de Janeiro, “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 
Foucault traces out an even longer history of this relation between truth and juris-
diction, leading from the Homeric era, through the tragedy of Oedipus and the 
medieval practices of inquiry, up to the practices of examination and panopticism in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (EEW3, 1–89). What these histories show 
is the increasing instantiation and prioritization of procedures of truth over jurisdic-
tion in the i eld of politics. Stated otherwise, there were always procedures of truth 
embedded within jurisdiction, but increasingly truth became a principle of verii ca-
tion, rationalization, and individualization, exerting a much greater force than juris-
diction itself. 
 Modern veridical forms have increasingly moved away from truth-events and 
rituals (such as the Homeric trial by test or combat) toward a reign of demonstrative 
truth where there is a totalizing grid of all possible subjects to be known and con-
trolled. The Panopticon is one such example of a totalizing  tableau vivant where all 
subjects can be placed and known at all times. In this case, we see how demonstrative 
truth is not tied to a purely scientii c history but a political history that set up the 
conditions for subjects to be observable, controllable, and visible at all times and all 
places. 
 In Foucault’s i nal works on the technologies of subjectivity, the problematic 
of the government of human beings (self and others) by truth is developed to focus 
more extensively on the government of self by truth. If his earlier studies examined 
the government of others by truth in more depth, his later work will show the net-
work that l ows between self and other, and between politics and ethics. These late 
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139022309.090
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Loyola Marymount William H. Hannon Library, on 18 Oct 2018 at 18:11:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Truth / 523
studies do not come at the expense of the studies on power but instead deepen the 
analysis of the government of human beings by truth. A theory of power in itself was 
never his aim, explains Foucault, but rather a study of techniques of subjection and 
rel exivity: “I am working on the history, at a given moment, of the way rel exivity of 
self upon self was established, and the discourse of truth linked to it” (EEW2, 452). 
 The analysis of technologies of subjectivity, furthermore, deepens the critique 
of self-evidence and the demonstrative reign of truth. Here, Foucault examines the 
different rituals and procedures through which subjects recognize or speak truths of 
themselves. With each of these late studies, he accounts for a different set of prac-
tices that are required of the subject to encounter or speak a truth, and none of them 
begin with the idea of a natural subject with immediate access to the true (EEW1, 
290). Since Descartes, philosophy has searched for a direct and natural relationship 
between the subject who knows and the object it knows. In what Foucault cautiously 
terms the “Cartesian moment,” the subject takes on a form of self-evidence where 
there is a direct interior link between the  I think and its access to a clear and distinct 
truth (ECF-HOS, 14). This Cartesian moment founds a relationship between sub-
jectivity and truth that is free from ritual, practice,  askesis , and self-transformation. 
 It is a form of subjectivity freed from what Foucault calls “ spirituality,” or the set of 
necessary transformations required of the subject to access the truth (ECF-HOS, 
15–16). Foucault’s interest in the practices of self in antiquity addresses a variety of 
different modes of spirituality; that is, the modes of how the subject is formed in 
relation to an event of truth. 
 Foucault assigns a term for this relationship between subjectivity and the event 
of truth in his 1979–1980 course at the Collège de France, “Du Gouvernement des 
Vivants”:  alethurgy or  alethurgical forms (FCF-GDV, 8–9). Alethurgy combines the 
Greek word for truth,  aletheia , with the verb for work or production,  ergon . Thus, 
etymologically speaking,  alethurgy refers to the production of the truth. Foucault 
certainly has a critique of Heidegger in mind here by proposing a reformulation of 
the Greek term to emphasize the  production of truth rather than its  unveiling or  dis-
closure . For Foucault, truth has no underlying substratum to be unveiled or disclosed. 
Instead, alethurgical forms will consider the production of truth through rituals and 
practices where the subject manifests, recognizes, speaks, or forms an obligation 
to truth. Whereas archaeology investigated the historical event through which a 
broader regime of truth came into place at the level of scientii c discourse, alethurgy 
will focus more directly on the event of truth as it occurs through the practices and 
rituals carried out by and through the subject. What are the rituals and procedures 
through which a truth gains its force at the level of the subject? What effects of 
transformation does truth have on the subject, and how have we established such a 
devotion to truth in the history of the West? 
 Here it might be asked, and Foucault poses this question himself: why continue 
using the notion of truth for these practices and rituals? The archaeological studies 
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emphasized the process through which the human became an object of scientii c 
discourse s of truth. Yet, Foucault wants to show that truth had a different history 
and a different set of rules prior to the modern scientii c understanding of truth as 
objective and demonstrative. Truth has not always presented itself as an ahistorical 
and unconditioned object (see also Detienne  1999 ). These studies in antiquity aim to 
restore the modality of the event to the advent of truth. In a late interview, Foucault 
clarii ed this emphasis on truth:
 After all, why truth? How did it come about that all of Western culture began to 
revolve around this obligation of truth which has taken a lot of different forms? 
Things being as they are, nothing so far has shown that it is possible to dei ne a 
strategy outside of this concern. It is within the i eld of the obligation to truth 
that it is possible to move about in one way or another, sometimes against the 
effects of domination which may be linked to structures of truth or institutions 
entrusted with truth. . . . Thus, one escaped from a domination of truth not by 
playing a game that was totally different from the game of truth but by playing 
the same game differently, or playing another game, another, with other trump 
cards. (EEW1, 295) 
 There is no pure outside to the truth game but only a different set of rules and a dif-
ferent set of possible cards. Foucault’s studies of the ancient world do not then seek 
to escape games of truth but to examine a different set of rules and cards by which 
these games were played. In order to do this, they analyze games of truth that are 
specii cally tied to the character of the event: in terms of rituals, practices, forms of 
speech, and  askesis . 
 In this movement to examine a whole different set of truth games free from 
the demonstrative reign of self-evidence, Foucault will show the different forms 
in which truth was not primarily predicated on an epistemological but rather an 
ethical (or political) relation in antiquity. For example, in  The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject , he shows that modern philosophy has entirely overlooked the fundamen-
tal link between the care of the self ( epimeleia heautou ) and truth in antiquity. The 
maxim at Delphi, know thyself ( gno thi seauton ), has almost completely overshad-
owed this other history. Foucault shows the Hellenistic practices through which 
self-care was always required of the subject in order to have access to truth, and 
where self-knowledge only had meaning with respect to a preliminary care of the 
self. A reexamination of the i gure of Socrates in  The Apology illuminates the central-
ity of this theme of self-care. Here, Socrates is fundamentally a character who urges 
others to take care of themselves, and it is only through such care that they might 
eventually attain the path to wisdom. This theme is clearly present in all of Stoic 
philosophy as well, and Foucault shows that it was, in fact, a fundamental concern 
of all of antiquity. 
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 In  The Courage of Truth , Foucault extends his studies of  parre sia (frank speech 
or fearless truth-telling) from the previous year’s course, “The Government of Self 
and Others,” and shows the way in which the true discourse of a subject is bound not 
to a condition of knowledge but an ethical and political condition. For example, in 
Plato ’s  Laches , Socrates’ ability to speak the truth is predicated not on a correspon-
dence with his knowledge but on an ethical relation of mastery he has achieved in 
his deeds. Thus, it is through the harmony between words and deeds that Socrates 
has access to the true and frank discourse of  parre sia .  The Cynics radicalize this 
harmony and ask the question: what is the form of life such that we can make the 
brilliance of the truth appear in the very form of our existence? The Cynics arrive 
at a point where  parre sia becomes a confrontational form of life over and above a 
confrontational form of speech. Thus, we see that the  alethurgical appearance of 
truth is already produced in the mode of existence itself, in the  bios , which does not 
necessarily await the articulation of the  logos to become visible : “In short, Cynicism 
makes life, existence,  bios , what could be called an alethurgy, a manifestation of truth” 
(ECF-COT, 172). Arriving at the end of Foucault’s philosophical career, we are quite 
far from the reign of self-evidence. Instead truth is manifested in the scandalous 
practice of Cynic critique , one that brilliantly appears through  bios rather than  logos 
with the force of an event. 
 In concluding, it is worth considering two critiques often posed to Foucault’s 
philosophy of truth. The i rst is the claim that Foucault is nothing more than a rad-
ical relativist and so must not be able to tell us very much about truth. This claim 
fails to grasp the nature of a regime of truth that is precisely not just any set of 
rules or rituals but ones that have been historically instantiated to have determinate 
effects on the very being of  the subject. The radical relativist would have no inter-
est in games of truth, because the radical relativist thinks that there are no rules of 
constraint and that any and all acts may pass as true depending on the beliefs or 
opinions of the individual. This position could not be further from Foucault’s view 
that we must understand the specii c constraints that lead us to formulate and carry 
out truths on ourselves, whether it be in scientii c studies that objectify the subject, 
practices of power that conduct the subject, or in the ethical relations that the sub-
ject holds to itself. Truth is always embedded within a network of constraints and 
possible actions. 
 The second critique leveled against Foucault asks about the truth content of his 
own utterances that he produces in his books, essays, and interviews. In response to 
this question, Foucault claims that his books should be read as experiences and not 
as factual claims to be verii ed as true or false (EEW3, 239–246). Foucault’s aim in 
writing philosophy is not to expose us to some deeper truth, for this would return 
his work to the very ideology theory that his work aims to displace. Instead, these 
experience books aim at the immanent critique of the intolerable effects of power 
and subjection that certain discourses of truth hold for the subject. The aim is not 
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to break free from the regime of truth as such but to locate the points of resistance 
where the rules of the games might be constructed otherwise. These points of resis-
tance are most often located in those places where Foucault sees the possibility of 
restoring the status of truth as event over and against a demonstrative truth that 
appears self-evident. 
 This philosophy of truth is certainly not one that seeks to provide a theory of 
truth as such. It is instead a critical history of different truth regimes, with the aim 
being not to show that any particular regime is true or false but to demonstrate the 
rules of construction and the effects and constraints that these regimes have on the 
subject. In our own time, these constraints have increasingly become ossii ed around 
the self-evident and necessary notion of truth as demonstration (see also Lorenzini 
 2010 ). Foucault’s histories aim to shatter the self-evidence of demonstrative truth by 
showing that truth is itself an event with its own conditions, history, and spatiotem-
poral foundations. 
 Demonstrative truth is true regardless of its place or time; dwelling everywhere, 
it can be known by anyone at any time. It is a truth waiting to be discovered and 
one that is progressively clarii ed and grasped through history. The truth-event is by 
contrast like a lightning bolt that transforms those who come into contact with it. 
It is a truth belonging to the order of force and not to the order of knowledge . This 
truth is a 
 dispersed, discontinuous, interrupted truth which will only speak or appear from 
time to time, where it wishes to, in certain places; a truth which does not appear 
everywhere, at all times, or for everyone; a truth which is not waiting for us, because 
it is a truth which has its favourable moments, its propitious places, its privileged 
agents and bearers. It is a truth which has its geography. (ECF-PP, 236) 
 In this sense, all of Foucault’s studies aim at studying truth as an event to show the 
conditions of space , time, the distribution of bodies, knowledge, and power that 
enable a particular truth to emerge and gain force at a particular time and place. If 
Foucault’s own discourse is allied to a truth claim, it is to the character of truth as 
an event. It is a discourse that works to produce this effect of transformation on the 
level of force and not strictly on the epistemological level of what is to be known. 
Perhaps, then, a different experience of truth in its force as an event could open the 
points of contingency where this “animal of truth” might shatter the dominion of 
demonstration with the brilliance of a lightning bolt. 
 Don T.  Deere 
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